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consumer goods"." This is strong language and needs a little more
argument than Professor Eaer gives it or refers to.
Two chapters, in my opinion, are not up to the calibre of the
rest of the book. Perhaps too much has already been written
(though not enough action taken) in the area of exemption clauses,
limitations of liability, contrats d'adhésion (call it what you will)
and an effort was made to add something new; for whatever the
reason, Mr. Côto's "Exculpatory Clauses"" is too brief, with too lit-
tle good argument on the policy questions and next to no reference
to recent Canadian cases." Professor Williams' "Misrepresentation
in Commercial Transactions"" is terribly hard to follow and things
are passed off rather glibly. For example, reference to the Combines
Investigation Act with no citation of jurisdiction (though he can
probably assume we know) and date (the section he refers to is
a recent amendment) ;` or, with reference to the legal effect of an
advertising "puff" :16
Thus, the law of contracts depends on whether an ordinary reasonable
man, would think the statements were predominantly statements of fact
or opinion . It may be thought that with the increased resort to equitable
estoppel and to the tort of negligent misrepresentation there would be
an increased dependence on the criterion of how far an ordinary reason-
able man would rely on the statements.
I am afraid I am still lost.
Taking the book as a whole, there is one pervading after-taste .
That is, the increasing development of tort law in the commercial
area. It always seemed that the business world rested on the firm
foundation of the law of contracts and its offshoots, such as sale
of goods, credit law, and so on. But here we have a new book on
business law, a Canadian book published in 1971, and the law of
tort plays a very major part in it. Negligence, misrepresentation, in-
terference with business relations- these have a very vital but not-
yet-fully-explored part to play in the commercial field. The com-
mercial man, a tort lawyer? One used to think the latter only
chased ambulances .
J . W. SAMUELS*
Restatement of thé Law Second. Conflict of Laws 2d . By TIIE
AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE. 3 Vols. St . Paul, Minn. : American
11 P. 240. Italics are the author's .
12 P. 1 .
13 They are mentioned in footnotes with no comment.
19In . 25 .is P. 26.is ln. 28 .I. W. Samuels, of the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario,London, Ontario.
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Law Institute Publishers . 1971 . Pp . Vol. 1 : xxviii, 734; Vol.
2: xxiv, 524; Vol. 3 : x1vi, 784. (No price given)
Private International Law. Eighth Edition. By G. C. CHESHIRE
and P. M. NORTH. London : Butterworth. 1970. Pp . xxi, 709.
($23.10)
The Conflict of Laws . By J. H. C. MORRIS, D.C.L., F.B.A . Lon-
don: Stevens and Sons Limited. 1971 . Pp . xxxiv, 570. ($14.15
hardbound; $10.10 paperbound)
The publication of the Official Draft of the Restatement of the
Law Second on conflict of laws, approved by the American Law
Institute at the Annual Meeting of 1969, constitutes an event of
major significance because of the frequency with which American
courts rely on the work of -the Institute and the interest it in-
variably arouses abroad . The Restatement Second supersedes en-
tirely the original Restatement of this subject published in 1934 .
As the Director of the Institute states in the Prefacer "In basic
analysis and technique, in the position taken on a host of issues,
in the elaboration of the commentary and addition of Reporter's
Notes, what is presented here is a fresh treatment of the subject."
The Restatement Second rejects the rigid rules that were the
characteristic of the first Restatement as the Institute now recog-
nizes that "black-letter formulations often must consist of open
ended standards, gaining further content from reasoned elabora-
tion in the comments and specific instances of application given
there or in the notes of the Reporter"?
The new edition of Cheshire's Private International Law now
jointly authored by Professors G. C. Cheshire and P. M. North
continues a time-honoured tradition of excellence . It contains a
number of changes and additions most of which were prompted
by the legislature and the judiciary.
Professor J. H. C. Morris' Conflict of Laws is not a shortened
version of Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws' prepared
for the use of students . Although in the main it follows the ar
rangement of Dicey and Morris there are many variations in-
cluding new chapyters and also many original ideas which are the
product of Dr. Morris' long and deep study of his subject.
The chapter on torts in the three works under review and
Dr . Morris' new chapter on theories and methods are very good
illustrations of their high quality and usefulness to practitioners,
teachers and students because,
. . the problem of torts has moved into the centre of the discussion
of methodological issues in the conflict of laws, or (in simpler lan-
1 Vol. 1, p. vii.
2 Ibid.
3 (8th ed., 1967).
19721 evue des Livres
	
367
guage) the discussion of why courts apply foreign law, and on what
basis do they choose it,'
and also because,
. . . in the twentieth century the law of torts has responded to the .
pressures of the technological revolution as applied to the manufacture
and distribution of products and to the means of transport and com-
munications5
In Chaplin v. Boys' a majority of the House of Lords rejected
the concept of the proper law of the tort and left Phillips v. Eyre'
as the basis of English law :
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England, for a wrong
alleged to have been committed abroad, two conditions must be ful-
filled. First, the wrong must be of such a character that it would have
been actionable if committed in England. . . . Secondly, the act must
not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done .
Professor North is of the opinion that the first part of the rule
which was originally enunciated in the Halley' case places too
much emphasis upon the accident of the forum and rightly sug-
gests that it should be interpreted to mean that the lex fori will
recognize a type of liability roughly similar to that for which the
plaintiff seeks a remedy .' Unfortunately this point of view has not
been accepted by the House of Lords. A plaintiff who sues on a
foreign tort in England must show that the wrong of the de-
fendant would have been actionable had it been committed in
]England .
With respect to the second part of the rule in Phillips v. Eyre,
the majority of the House of Lords clearly rejected the interpreta-
tion given to the word "justifiable" by the Court of Appeal in
Machado v. Fontes.l' Non-justifiability by the lex loci delicti com-
missi has now been replaced by actionability by the lex loci delicti
commissi."
However, as Dr. Morris points out actionability by the lex
loci delicti must mean civil liability:"
There is no requirement that the conduct must be tortious by the
lex loci delicti; it is sufficient if by that law the defendant's liability to
pay damages is contractual, quasi-contractual, quasi-delictual, pro-
prietary or sui generis.
'Morris, p. 256.
s Ibid.
1 [19691 2 All E.R. 1085, [19691 3 W.L.
7 (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B . 1, at pp. 28-29 .
11 (1868), L.R . 2 P.C. 193 .
' Cheshire, p . 265.10 [18971 2 Q.B. 231 .
11 See for instance Lord Wilberforce, supra, note 6, at pp. 329-330,
339-391 (W.L.R.), Lord Guest, !bid., at p . 334 (W.L.R.) .
12 Morris, p. 271 .
. 322 .
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It seems natural to assume that the wrong of the defendant en-
tailed civil liability by the law of the place where it was commit-
ted. The word "justifiaNe" or "non-justifiable"" was too ambig-
uous to have a place in a broad rule of conflict of laws. "Action-
able" is a technical term which cannot be interpreted in such a
way that a remedy would be granted by the forum where none
existed in the place of wrong. Thus, today, to justify an action in
England for a tort committed abroad the conduct must be civilly
actionable by English law and by the law of the country in
which the conduct occurred. It is surprising that it took so long
for the English courts to reject such an indefensible rule which,
in its application, leads to results often so contrary to the prin-
ciples of fair play . Why should a plaintiff obtain a remedy denied
to him in the country where he suffered injury9
After reviewing the various theories that have been advanced
to explain Phillips v. Eyre, Professor North comes to the con-
clusion that this case provides a rule for choice of law and not one
of jurisdiction . This view does not mean that actionability by both
the lex loci delicti and the lex fort resolves the issue of the
substantive law. Although Chaplin v. Boys does not provide a
clear answer, the author is forced to recognize that the lex fort
is the dominant substantive law, thus unduly favouring the de-
fendant.
In the end, one must agree with Professor North that Chaplin
v. Boys does not constitute a landmark in the field of conflict
of laws :"
Judicial law-making of this kind is of little service to the conflict of
laws and it is not surprising that the Lord Chancellor has established
a committee to examine the rules governing choice of law in proceed-
ings based upon foreign torts.
Let us hope that, in Canada, the higher courts will at long last
reconsider Machado v. Fontes or if not that the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity o£ Legislations will finally com-
plete their work on the Draft Foreign Torts Act."
While no definite position is taken in Cheshire's book as to
which theory of the governing law should be taken by the courts,
"Machado v. Fontes, supra, footnote 10, is still the law in Canada :
See La Van v. Danyluk and Danyluk (1970), 75 W.W.R . 500 (B.C .)
applying McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] S.C.R . 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65 and
Canadian National Steamships Co. Ltd. v. Watson, [1939] S.C.R . 11, and
Castel (1971), 49 Can. Bar Rev. 632; Carr, Torts in the Conflict of Laws
in British Columbia: La Van v. Danyluk (1971), 6 U.B.C.L . Rev. 353.
"Cheshire, p. 275.
1SSee Castel and Cr6peau, Views from Canada (1971), 19 Am. J.
Comp . L. 17, at p. 31 . Note that in 1970, the Conference adopted the
Conflict of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act based on the 1968 Hague Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, see Castel and Cr6-
peau, ibid., at p. 19.
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Dr. Morris in his Conflict of Laws is still a supporter of the
proper law of the tort which he enunciated more than twenty years
ago:`
. while in many, perhaps most, situations there would be no need
to look beyond the place of wrong, we ought to have a conflict rule
broad enough and flexible enough to take care of the exceptional situa-
tions as well as the more normal ones : otherwise the results will begin
to offend our common sense?'
. it seems unlikely that a single mechanical formula will produce
satisfactory results when applied to all kinds of torts and to all kinds
of issues .""
Dr. Morris strongly criticizes the first part of the rule in Phillips v.
Eyre and is distressed by the fact that the House of Lords in
Chaplin v. Boys went out of their way unanimously to approve
it . As he points out:
. . . if certainty and the promotion of English ideas of justice are to
be the only goals, why not scrap the second rule in Phillips v . Eyre
and dispense with any reference to foreign law whatsoever? ls
Dr. Morris offers two answers to the question of what is the
ratio decidendi for Chaplin v. Boys . The first is that there is none
and the second that we can pick and choose which ratio we prefer.
®f course he prefers the proper law of the tort "not only because
he invented it, but also because . . . the other possible rationes
seem retrograde and likely to produce unacceptable results"."
He . does not agree with professor North that Chaplin v. Boys
sounds the death-knell of the proper law of the tort. Analysing
the, views of Lords Hodson, Wilberforce and Pearson, he comes
to the conclusion that quite on the contrary, the first step has been
taken in the direction of injecting some flexibility into the rules
in Phillips v. Eyre. He views the proper law of the tort theory as
an exception to the double actionability rule. Thus, as a result
of Chaplin v. Boys, in England:
. a particular issue may be governed by the law of the country
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship
with the occurence and the parties . For Lord Hodson stressed that the
rule in Phillips v. Eyre must be given a flexible interpretation because
Willes J. himself said that the rule was only applicable "as a general
rule"
Professor North does not mention this exception although it
should be accepted by the )English courts.
"The Proper Law of a Tort (1951), 64 kiarv. L. Rev. 881 .
"'Morris, p . 259.""Ibid., p. 260 .is Ibid., p. 264.
so Ibid., p. 269 .
21 Ibid., p. 271 .
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Dr. Morris' approach has found its way in the Restatement
Second on conflict of laws . In the light of the difficulties and com-
plexides of the subject of foreign torts, the American Law Institute
did not wish to formulate a precise rule or series of rules. It has
simply stated as a general principle that the court will apply the
local law of the state of most significant relationships. In each
case the court must accommodate a certain number of underlying
factors.
The rights and liabilities of the parties in tort are to be govern-
ed by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties. Separate rules are stated for different torts and for
different issues in tort. "In other words, the identity of the state
of most significant relationship is said to depend upon the nature
of the tort and upon the particular issue."" Furthermore, in reach-
ing its decision the court must give greater weight to certain
choice of law policies than to the demands of vested rights . Ao-
cording to section 145 :
The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with res-
pect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative im-
portance with respect to the particular issue.
The analysis of choice of law rules in the field of torts found in
the Restatement Second is of great interest to Canadians at a
time when the courts seem hesitant about abandoning the tra-
ditional approach as exemplified in Machado v. Fontes and
McClean v. Pettigrew."
Unlike the American courts which have considered the mat-
ter, Canadian courts do not seem to prefer a more flexible ap-
proach in which the various policy factors are considered, on the
ground that its adoption would produce uncertainty in the law.
As Dr. Morris points out:"
It is a pity that counsel in Chaplin v. Boys were unable to cite any
I' Restatement Second, Vol. 1, p. 413.
"See supra, footnote 13 .
z¢ P. 283.
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American cases more recent than Dym v. Gordon ((1965), 16 N.Y.
2d 120, 209 N.F . 2d 792), of they had done so, it seems un-
likely that the House of Lords would have stigmatised the new flexible
approach as productive of uncertainty . Nor would Lord Wilberforce
have said that "if one lesson emerges from the United States decisions
it is that case to case decisions do not add up to a system of Justice"
([19691 3 W.L.R. 322, at p . 343) . For if that is true, then we might as
well scrap not only the conflict of laws but also the common law
itself.
Professor Morris' chapter on "Theories and Methods" is in-
teresting because it contains an appraisal of the spate of writing
in the United Mates on theories and methods in the conflict of
laws . In a few pages brilliantly written, he has accomplished the
seemingly impossible task of bringing order out of chaos, and for
this we must be grateful to him.
The theories (not all of which are of American origin) seek to ex-
plain how it is that foreign law is applied in the forum despite the
division of the world into independent sovereign States. The methods
offer new techniques for solving choice of law problems."
The theories discussed are the comity theory, the vested rights
theory and the local law theory. With these, most of us are
already familiar . It is with respect to methods that Dr. Morris'
analysis is enlightening and refreshing as many students of con-
flict of laws often have difficulty distinguishing one method from
the other. h3[e discusses first the method which prefers rule-select-
ting rules to jurisdiction-selecting rules (Cavers) ; secondly, gov-
ernmental interest analysis (Currie) ; thirdly, the interpretation of
forum policy (Ehrenzweig) ; fourthly, principles of preference
(Cavers) ; and lastly the use of choice-influencing factors as exem-
plified by the Restatement Second .
With respect to theories, it should be noted that the Restate-
ment Second has abandoned the vested rights theory and all its
consequences . In the first Restatement, choice of law rules in
torts and contracts derived from vested rights analysis and were
immutable and therefore led to a mechanical application of the
local law of the place where the injury occurred in the field of
torts and the law of the place in which the contract became bind-
ing or, when performance was in issue, where the contract was
to be performed,"' in the field of contracts. ®n the other hand, the
estatement Second, as noted above, adopts the flexible rule that
rights and liabilities with respect to a particular issue are deter-
mined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has
"the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties".
In ascertaining the law ,applicable to the issue at hand the courts
"s ID. 517.
"First Restatement, ss 377, 332, 358 . For a review of the first Re-
statement see Willis (1936), 14 Can . Bar. Rev. 1 .
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should be guided by a number of enumerated but not exclusive
factors or policies ." These policies are not listed in the order of
their relative importance. As often some of the factors point in
different directions in all but the simplest case, any choice of law
rule represents an accommodation of conflicting values . Thus
section 6 states
Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice
of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the par-
ticular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformitv of result . and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied .
". . . this mode of treatment leaves the answer to specific prob-
lems very much at large. There is, therefore, wherever possible, a
secondary statement on blackletter setting forth the choice of
law the courts will `usually' make in given situations . These for-
mulations are cast as empirical appraisals rather than supported
rules to indicate how far the statements may be subject to revalua-
tion in a concrete instance in light of the more general and open-
ended norm"."
Conflicts problems are resolved in a flexible manner, case by
case, issue by issue." In other words, the Restatement Second re-
treats from dogma in the sense that many basic norms consist of
standards that are open-ended . This does not mean the Restate-
ment Second rejects formulated conflict of laws rules. For instance
in parts of property the rules are sufficiently precise to permit
them to be applied in the decision without reference to the factors
which underlie them. However as the Reporter points out:''
Statement of precise rules in many areas of choice of law is made even
more difficult by the great variety of situations and of issues, by the
fact that many of these situations and issues have not been thoroughly
explored by the courts, by the generality of statements frequently
used by the courts in their opinions, and by the new grounds of deci-
sion stated in many of the more recent opinions .
29 Restatement Second, s. 6.
29 Restatement Second, Vol. 1, Preface, p. viii.
19 Morris, p. 546.
s° Restatement Second, Vol. 1, p. 13 .
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In spite of the virulent attacks made upon the very idea of
re-stating the rules or standards to be applied by the courts in
conflict of laws cases.," Professor Reese, the Reporter, and his
colleagues have performed their task with great success and have
come up with a very rational and workable system which will
without doubt have a great constructive influence on the solutions
to be adopted by the courts in the United States and elsewhere
when confronted with difficult conflict problems .
Dr . Morris takes a realistic although somewhat conservative
view when he points out that:"
It does not seem necessary to abandon the whole existing system of
the conflict of laws with its apparatus of concepts and rules, as long
as it yields acceptable results . It economises thought to be able to
apply a conflict rule instead of having to think out each problem
afresh each time it arises .
I fully agree with Dr . Morris that the new American -methods,
except for the choice influencing factors of the Restatement Second,
are not suitable for adoption by English or Canadian courts in
international cases.
We would do better to build on what is good in the traditional system,
as the Restatement Second seeks to do, rather than to abolish that
system altogether and start again . On the other hand, these methods
have three lessons which we should do well to take to heart. The first
is that choice of law rules should be flexible and should be flexibly
applied . The second is that they should never be applied without some
regard to the content of the foreign law referred to . The third is that
we should be on the alert to identify and avoid false conflicts, and not
be afraid to decide such cases in accordance with the law that is
common to both countries, rather .than in accordance with traditional
conflict rules."
The three books reviewed here are well printed and easy to
read . They also contain excellent indexes, tables of cases, statutes,
rules of the Supreme Court and books referred to . In the Restate
ment of the Law Second on the conflict of laws, in addition to
the valuable Comments explaining each rule and which carry the
approval of the Institute, the Reporter's Notes are of great im-
" See for instance Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in its His-
torical Perspective; Should the Restatement be "Continued" (1954), 103
U. of Pa. L. Rev . 133 ; The Second Conflicts Restatement : A Last Appeal
for its withdrawal (1965), 113 U . of Pa . L . Rev. 1230. Professor Ehrenz-
weig raises four questions : Should the draft not be expressly limited to
interstate conflicts? Should it not be revised with a view to achieving
greater theoretical consistency? Should it not be revised to respond to
current doctrine? Should it not be limited to those narrow propositions
which are settled in light of judicial practice (rather than mere language)?
In my opinion the Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws answers positive-
ly at least some of these questions .
82 P . 530 .
33 Ibid., p. 547.
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portance as they give the reader an up-to-date account of American
case law on the topic under discussion. Volume 3 also contains
parallel tables between the Restatement of the Law Second and
the first Restatement" as well as court citations to the first and
second Restatement and a table of cases cited in the Reporter's
Notes.
To anyone teaching or studying conflict of laws, each of
these books should be very important as a guide and as a source
reference. The fact that they are not concerned with Canadian
conflict rules does not detract from their value due to the com-
mon legal tradition which Canada shares with England and the
United States . They should certainly find a place in the library of
anyone interested in conflict of laws, a discipline of increasing
practical importance in the world and especially in federal states
such as Canada.
J.-G. CASTEL*
Basic Documents on Human Rights. Edited by IAN BROwNLIE .
Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1971 . Pp . x, 531 . ($6.50 paper-
bound)
The mass of documentary and statutory material in international
law has become so overwhelming that the only way to maintain
manageability for the student is through various collections of
these documents in their different subject areas. A welcome ad-
dition to such collections is Dr . Ian Brownlie's Basic Documents
on Human Rights . In this work which in its field is far more
substantial and comprehensive than his Basic Documents in In-
ternational Law, Dr. Brownlie seeks "to provide a useful collection
of sources on human rights" which will be "of help to a variety of
readers and not merely to those with specialist interests in political
science, international relations, or law"! This is done in a work
of ten parts under the following headings ; national constitutions,
standard setting by the United Nations, instruments sponsored by
the United Nations, the contributions of the International Labour
Organization, UNESCO and European institutions, developments
in Latin America, Africa and Asia, the concept of equality and the
effect of trade and development on human rights . The collection is
also cross-referenced by a relatively comprehensive index.
Each part commences with an introductory note, which varies
in length, explaining the editor's purpose in including the parti-
cular material, and individual conventions and other documents
receive a brief introduction . A criticism might be levelled at the
34 (1934) .
* J.-G. Castel, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto,
Ontario.
'Preface, p . v.
